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Article 6

MARYLAND ZONING - THE COURT
AND ITS CRITICS
By

GEORGE W.

LIEBMANN*

One who holds to the view that "you cannot understand the famous
unless you feel the pulse of the obscure"1 or who shares with Arnold
Bennett the conviction that history is the experience of ordinary people
in extraordinary times2 is likely to have his impression confirmed by
inspection of the articles on Maryland zoning in the Review's last winter
issue and in a recent issue of The American Political Science Review.'
For their authors have managed to reflect in a few pages on a remote
subject intellectual tendencies which are having a wide (and in the
view of this writer largely pernicious) effect on other more vital areas
of American law, politics and "political science." If the legal commentator may be charged with nothing worse than a somewhat uncritical acceptance of the wisdom and propriety of judicial policy making in the land use field, less charity may be shown to the political
scientist. That scholar has been true to prevailing (or at least nascent)
fashions in his preference of the quantitative over the rational approach
to analysis of judicial decisions; in a taste for statistical techniques
and a distaste for data drawn from history and disciplines other than
that purportedly utilized and in an unfortunate willingness to indulge
in sweeping generalizations on the basis of fragmentary or nonexistent
evidence.
Mr. Sickels begins his assault on the performance of the Maryland
Court of Appeals in zoning cases with an attack on the court as an
institution and on its organization, personnel and internal operation.
His essential thesis is that Maryland zoning doctrine is merely a facade
behind which judges indulge their vagrant prejudices as to community
development or the merits of particular zoning applications. 4 Cases
are assigned at random to shifting panels of the court, which slavishly
accepts the decision of the member assigned to write the opinion. The
result, we are told, is an inconsistency in decision-making that contravenes legal and political values. By contrast, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, a representative body made up of men with
"diversity of background, philosophy and temperament" 5 are more
defensible, since the court "is highly consistent in the general run of
its business, because the tendencies of each of its members are known
* A.B. 1960, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago; Law Clerk

for Chief Judge Brune of the Maryland Court of Appeals, 1963-1964; Associate, Frank,
Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. BUTTINGER, IN THE TWILIGHT Ol SOCIALISM 1 (1953).
2. Cf. Preface to BENNETT, THn OLD WIVEs' TALE (1911).

3. Goldman, Zoning Change: Flexibility v. Stability, 26

MD.

L.

Rlv. 48 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as Goldman] ; Sickels, The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning

Cases in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 Amd. POL. Sci. REV. 100 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Sickels].
4. Mr. Sickels states: "Protestations notwithstanding, the tools of activism are
well honed and ready at hand in Maryland. The frequency of their use refutes the
Court's claim of judicial restraint.
Sickels, at 102.
5. Id. at 101.
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with some accuracy and the prediction of majority positions often
follows by simple arithmetic."6
Let us now look at Mr. Sickels' data to see whether it effectively
supports these strong strictures or whether it may be dismissed as
another example of what has elsewhere been described as "putting
jurisprudential doctrine to political ends: a pragmatic utilization of

academic tools." 7
Mr. Sickels portrays the Maryland court as an intellectually moribund institution, lacking "a penchant for lively dissent." Indeed, the
reader is likely to gain the impression that dissent is virtually unknown
in Maryland, for the author's Table 1 informs us that in Maryland the
"Number of Cases with Dissent" is "0."' It is regrettable that the
data in the author's table involves a sample of only 25 cases and that
no distinction is made between courts with mandatory jurisdiction and
those that can pick and choose their cases. Those familiar with the
work of the Maryland court in recent years will recall numerous instances of vigorous and at times acrimonious dissent, dissent not confined to non-zoning cases.
Mr. Sickels undertakes to document his assertion that "The Court
of Appeals has acquiesced a system of decision which rests on the
vicissitudes of case assignment," by reference to the opinions of two of
the court's judges: Judges Hall Hammond and William L. Henderson.
Confining his decision to 89 cases in which the Court of Appeals passed
upon grants of zoning variances by boards, Mr. Sickels noted that
"Judge Hammond has written opinions of the Court nine to one in
favor of sustaining the local zoning action and Judge Henderson has
recorded nine cases to two against the local authority."'" We are told
that this shows that the judges differed, "one favoring flexibility and
the other stability."" It is not clear whether the supposed difference
between the judges relates to their willingness to allow dispensations
from original zoning or to their attitude toward the weight to be given
to zoning board decisions. Since the cases in which the court has considered appeals from denial of zoning dispensations are left to one side
by his article, little is done to clarify this important ambiguity. To
arrive at his statistics, Mr. Sickels had to rule out cases turning on
procedural points, thereby eliminating a case in which Judge Hammond
wrote the opinion to reverse a grant of amendment by the zoning
6. Id. at 104.

7. Kurland, Book Review, 28 U. CHr. L. Riv. 580, 582 (1961). [Note: the
author has secured from Mr. Sickels the lists of cases on which his article is based.]
8. Sickels, at 100 n.3.
9. See, e.g., Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, 216 A.2d 530 (1966) ; MacDonald v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965) ; Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers
Forge Community Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 202 A.2d 612 (1964) ; Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell,
237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964) ; Restivo v. Princeton Constr. Co., 223 Md. 516,
165 A.2d 766 (1960); Mayor & City Council v. Berg, 216 Md. 292, 139 A.2d 703,
concurring opinion, 140 A.2d 663 (1958) ; Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md.
48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957) ; Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953) ; Mayor
and City Council v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948); Norwood Heights
Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor and City Council, 191 Md. 155, 60 A.2d 192 (1948).

The first few cases were unavailable to Mr. Sickels, but all the cases in this list
involved major issues of zoning policy.

10. Sickels, at 102.
11. Ibid.
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board. 12 Concurring and dissenting votes are likewise ignored even
where the court was split. In the important early case of Wakefield
v. Kraft,13 Judge Henderson joined Judge Hammond's opinion affirming grant of a reclassification in preference to the dissenting opinion
of Judge Sobeloff urging more intensive judicial review of the weight,
as well as the substantiality of the evidence. That concurrence hardly
squares with Mr. Sickels' portrait of Judge Henderson as a judge
favoring rigid stability in zoning and/or intensive judicial review of
decisions by local authorities.
The cases in which the court has reversed denials of reclassi-fications by zoning boards also raise difficulties for Mr. Sickels' critique
of the court. If on the one hand his thesis is that the judges differ
greatly in their deference to zoning boards ("zoning actions are practically certain to be upheld by Judge Hall Hammond"),"' then he
would seem under a duty to consider among other opinions that judge's
decision in Board of County Comm'rs v. Oak Hill Farms, a decision
which drew wider public interest than almost any other recent Maryland zoning case. In that case, the court was called upon to construe
the unique Prince George's County ordinance,' 6 since repealed,' 7 directing the courts to "weigh" the evidence in zoning cases. The validity
of the ordinance was challenged on the basis that it imposed legislative
functions on the courts and hence contravened the separation of powers.
The court found it unnecessary to reach this question holding that the
District Council's refusal to rezone was properly reversed as "arbitrary
and capricious" even under the "substantial evidence on the whole
record" test conventionally applied by the court. The controversial part
of the opinion was the repeated statement that "the line between the
test of substantiality of evidence on the whole record and that of
weight on the evidence is thin and difficult to delineate," thus suggesting that under either test the courts have considerable leeway to weigh
evidence and are freed from the limitations of the traditional substantial
evidence rule. That case was sharply criticized, both by a press concerned with possible increase in instability in zoning and by legal commentators,1 8 who charged the court with misunderstanding the teaching of the well-known Universal Camera case.'" The Maryland Court
has since retreated from its language in the Oak Hill Farms decision,
20
as to the meaning of the substantial evidence on a whole record rule,
12. Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964)

(appeal dis-

missed) ; Tyrie v. Baltimore County, 215 Md. 135, 137 A.2d 156 (1957).
13. 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953). See Judge Henderson's dissenting opinion in
Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor and City Council, 191 Md. 155, 163,

60 A.2d 192, 195 (1948), where he voted to affirm a board decision granting an apartment house permit, the majority of the court voting to reverse.
14. Sickels, at 102.

15. 232 Md. 274, 192 A.2d 761 (1963).
16. LAWS oP MD. ch. 780, § 79(i) (6) (1959).
17. See

LAWS or MD.

ch. 898, § 59-85(i) (1965).

18. Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. RZv. 1,

40-42 (1964). See also 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVg LAW TRgATISt §§ 29.02-.03 (1958).
19. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See Jaffe, The Right
to Judicial Review 1I, 71 HARV. L. Rpv. 769 (1958).
20. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Farr, 242 Md. 315, 322, 218 A.2d 923, 927
(1966); Board of County Comm'rs v. Meltzer, 239 Md. 144, 155, 210 A.2d 505, 511-12
(1965); Dal Maso v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 333, 340, 209 A.2d 62, 66
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but that opinion, whatever its merits, hardly squares with Mr. Sickels'
picture of Judge Hammond as a judge favoring extreme deference to
zoning board decisions. If on the other hand, Mr. Sickels' thesis is
that the judges' differences relate primarily to the degree of their
preference for stability in zoning then he would also have done well to
examine the several opinions of Judge Henderson reversing board
denials of zoning amendments. 1 Finally, another recent case (unavailable -to Mr. Sickels) deserving of study in reference to both of the
alternate
theses is Jobar Corporation v. Rodgers Forge Community
Ass'n,2 2 where the court reinstated a 'board decision granting a zoning
reclassification. The scathing dissenting opinion of Judge Hammond
ought to put to rest the view that zoning actions are "practically certain
to be upheld" by him because of a supposed extreme preference for
flexibility in zoning and deference to local boards. Furthermore, the
fact that, as in Wakefield v. Kraft and as in the more recent case of
Yorkdale v. Powell,2 3 the two judges were on the same side of a divided
court may also reflect on the notion that they stood "at extremes."
The fortuitous and insignificant nature of the statistical evidence adduced by Mr. Sickels is further demonstrated by the cases appearing
subsequent to his study, for five of Judge Hammond's more recent
determinations reversed board decisions. 4
The above discussion should dispose of the political scientist's
view that Maryland zoning opinions have been dependent upon the
vagaries of case assignment. While the court is known to assign most
cases at random in advance of argument, there is no warrant for the
suggestion that there is little collegial deliberation in the court. Not
only is there a vote by the five judges after argument and before the
opinion is written, but also "each one of the . . . opinions has to be

read in the presence of the other judges by the judge who has written
the opinion, and again there may be suggestions of changes . . .
before being released as the opinion of the court.
The suggestion that inconsistency reigns in part because since
1960 "Maryland has had the equivalent in another way of several
(1965); DePaul v. Board of County Comm'rs, 237 Md. 221, 226, 205 A.2d 805, 807
(1965); Dobry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 717, 216 A.2d 746 (1966);
MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 557, 210 A.2d 325, 329 (1965)
Mothershead v. Board of County Comm'rs, 240 Md. 365, 214 A.2d 326 (1965);
Sampson Bros., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 240 Md. 116, 213 A.2d 289 (1965);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 235 Md. 151, 200 A.2d 670 (1964);
Kaslow v. Mayor and City Council, 236 Md. 159, 161, 166, 202 A.2d 638, 639, 641 (1964).
21. See England v. Mayor and City Council, 230 Md. 43, 185 A.2d 378 (1962) ;
Restivo v. Princeton Constr. Co., 223 Md. 516, 165 A.2d 766 (1960) (dissenting
opinion); Grebow v. Mayor and City Council, 217 Md. 333, 142 A.2d 554 (1958).
Cf. Shannahan v. Ringgold, 212 Md. 481, 129 A.2d 797 (1957).
22. 236 Md. 106, 202 A.2d 612 (1964).
23. 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964).
24. See Judge Hammond's recent opinions in Polinger v. Briefs, 244 Md. 538,
224 A.2d 460 (1966) ; Board of County Comm'rs v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 210 A.2d 367
(1965); Greenblatt v. Toney Schloss Properties, Corp., 235 Md. 9, 200 A.2d 70
(1964); Jobar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge Community Ass'n, 236 Md. 106, 122, 202 A.2d
612, 621 (1964) (dissenting opinion), reversing board grants of reclassifications, and
his bitter and well-taken dissent in Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, 242, 216 A.2d 530,
539 (1966), the majority upholding a reclassification.
25. 64 TRANSACTIONS OP MD. STATE BAR Ass'N 293 (1959) (remarks of Judge

Stedman Prescott).
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Courts of Appeals with overlapping memberships,

' 26

is equally un-

founded. By reason of the provisions for reargument, 21 it is impossible

for loss of a vote (as distinct from loss of the persuasion) of a nonsitting member to change a result, a system which does more to insure
consistency than either a certiorari system or the panel systems extant
in several federal courts of appeal. The peculiar 1960 amendment
creating the panel system (an amendment not favored by most of the
Court of Appeals judges themselves) 2S derived from a desire to preserve to litigants in the face of an expanding case load the benefit of
the state constitutional tradition 9 of full plenary consideration and
swift final decision by the state's highest court. However unsound the
amendment may be in terms of judicial administration, encouragement of a tendency toward inconsistency in decision is the last ground
on which it should be criticised.
Examination of the record of the Maryland court in dealing with
the substance of zoning problems, will hopefully make clear that its
record in zoning cases is both reasonably creditable and reasonably
consistent, and certainly undeserving of special stricture.3 0 The causes
of difficulty in Maryland zoning law must be found elsewhere than in
the 'behavior of particular judges, and the reasons for it are of more
interest to thoughtful legal commentators and political scientists.
The Maryland court's record in zoning cases cannot be fairly
appraised without an awareness of the three great sources of difficulty
that have given American zoning law, and particularly the law applicable to reclassification, its frequently complex and confusing character. First, there is great tension between conventional doctrines of
judicial deference to administrative agencies developed in non-zoning
contexts and the pressure for more intensive judicial review which arises
from the subservience to the construction industry characteristic of
many zoning boards. It has been pointed out (most persistently by
Professor Myres McDougal of Yale)" that zoning law is essentially
a contest between the nation's largest industry and weak local boards,
largely unequipped with investigative facilities of their own and unaided by any countervailing force other than that supplied by spontane26. Sickels, at 101.
27. MD. CONsT. art. IV,

§ 14.

28. See 64 TRANSACrIONS o MD. STATE BA ASS'N 336-400 (1959).
29. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15.

30. The same cannot be said of the record of the Illinois court, for example. See
Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CHi. L. Rev.
509 (1959) ; Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning: A Study in Uncertainty, 15 U. OI. L. RUv. 87 (1947). See also that court's unfortunate opinion in
Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1963), holding that a
long-continued use illegal at its inception was entitled to treatment, in effect, as a nonconforming use by reason of the long delay in action to enjoin it. But see Salisbury
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 240 Md. 547, 214 A.2d 810 (1965). Recent proposals for
reform of the Illinois law would move the law of that state closer to the Maryland
pattern, by abolishing special use permits (Cf. note 57 infra), authorizing "floating
zones," requiring comprehensive plans, explicitly authorizing regulation of lot sizes,
requiring legislative hearings as reclassification requirements (see MD. CODE ANN.

art. 66B, § 22(d)), and altering rules relating to the standing of neighbors in zoning
cases. See Report on Proposed Legislation to Revise the Illinois Municipal Zoning
Enabling Act,

ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REAL PROPERTY NEWSLETTER, VOl.

no. 3 (March 1965).
31. See, e.g., McDougal, Book Review, 54 HARv. L. Rv. 526, 530 (1941).

10,
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ous protests by neighbors. To express a preference for local (or in
many instances state) regulation of industries is no doubt to express a
preference for a measure of laissez-faire.
At times the Maryland court has been urged to rectify by means
of intensified judicial review and modification of the substantial evidence rule the seeming imbalance between the contestants in zoning
cases just as the United States Supreme Court has on occasion been
charged with applying a more intensive standard of review to agencies
thought to be industry dominated. 2 The dissenting opinion of Judge
Sobeloff in Wakefield v. Kraft, and perhaps the opinion of Judge
Hammond in the Oak Hill Farms case, succumbs to this temptation.
However, the Maryland court in Wakefield and in the cases decided
before and since Oak Hill Farms3 has declined to play favorites
among administrative agencies. By applying the conventional substantial evidence rule the court has refused to act as the judge of
whether the public is better served by loose or more stringent regulation of building construction. It is in fact true that the public is not
always badly served by lax or flexible public regulation84 and that more
thorough enforcement of zoning restrictions might have been productive of shortages and unmet needs in a period of rapidly expanding
suburban population. The considerations justifying loose regulation
in zoning are similar to those retrospectively advanced in defense of
laissez-faire in manufacturing industries during the nineteenth century period of industrial expansion. 5 No doubt there is much to be
said against "suburban sprawl." Nonetheless, the writings of some
"community planners" and critics of the preferences given to uncontrolled single-family housing by zoning and tax law call to mind E. M.
Forster's doleful, if wry, observations:
The feudal ownership of land did bring dignity, whereas the
modern ownership of movables is reducing as again to a nomadic
horde. We are reverting to the civilization of luggage, and historians of the future will note how the middle classes accreted
possessions without taking root in the earth, and may find in this
the secret of their imaginative poverty. The Schlegels were certainly the poorer for the loss of Wickham Place. It had helped to
balance their lives and almost to counsel them. Nor is their
ground-landlord spiritually the richer. He has built flats on its
site, his motor-cars grow swifter, his exposures of Socialism move
trenchant. But he has split the precious distillation of the years,
and no chemistry of his can give it back to society again.3 6
The contemporary Maryland court has taken the view that more
stringent regulation should be the product of legislative, not judicial
32. DAvis, ADMINISTRTIVE LAW § 251 (1951).
33. See cases cited note 20 supra.
34. See, e.g., Levi, Book Review, 26 U. Cnl. L. Rnv. 672, 673 (1959).
35. See, e.g., Kirkland, INDUSTRY COMES op AGE: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 1860-97 (1961). Cf. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 11-12 (1966); Dunham,
A Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1958).
36. E. M. FORSTER, HowARLs END 149-50 (1921).
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action. But unlike earlier courts it has imposed no constitutional barriers to such action when it has been forthcoming, as it was, at least
for a while, in Prince George's County.
Second, a major source of difficulty arises from the fact that many
zoning determinations, especially reclassifications of particular lots by
legislative bodies, stand at the borderline -between legislative and
administrative action. As Judge Schaefer recently observed for the
Illinois court, "a zoning ordinance is a unique type of legislation in
that it must be comprehensive in the sense that it applies to all property
within the municipality and yet the regulations it prescribes are not
uniform. '37 This observation applies with even greater force to zoning
amendments. Two questions have plagued American courts: (1)
Should the standards of review properly applicable to reclassification
partake of the strong presumption of validity attached to most economic
legislation, or should courts scrutinize the evidence in support of the
reclassifications? (2) Should the zoning amendment process be accorded the normal freedom from constitutional requirements of notice
and hearing accorded legislative decisions or should it be held subject
to the standards of due process required where administrative agencies
adjudicate the rights of particular persons?
The first of these questions most American courts have answered
by "adopt [ing] the method which effectively discourages zoning litigation in other states, i.e., upholding the zoning in almost every case.' '38
The presumption of validity accorded spot reclassification affecting
only a particular builder and immediate neighbors is frequently equivalent to that accorded economic legislation of statewide impact: "[A]
zoning classification is presumed to be valid and should be disturbed
only ,if by clear and affirmative evidence it is shown to be arbitrary or
unreasonable. Since the board of supervisors is a legislative body,
precise standards to govern its determinations are not required."39
The Maryland court, as both commentators noted, extends no such presumption of validity to spot reclassifications, as distinct from comprehensive revisions, taking the view in Mandel and Southern Properties,
Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs0 that "one test for determining
whether action by a commission is legislative where vested rights of
liberty and property are not involved 'is whether there is laid down
a rule of future action which affects a group and not the direct appli37. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. City of Evanston, 30 Ill. 2d 479, 197 N.E.2d
705 (1964).
38. Bosselman, Substantial Constitutional Questions: Are Zoning Questions Sui
Generis, 53 ILL. BAR J. 752, 763 & n.45 (1965) (citing California cases).
39. Kotrich v. DuPage, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960). This is also the
theme of the dissenting opinion of Judge Barnes in MacDonald v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 557, 210 A.2d 325, 329 (1965). The Illinois court allows both
amendments in favor of particular uses and amendments of district lines on a virtually
unrestricted basis. The Maryland court condemns the former outright (see note 57
infra) and allows the latter only on a showing of change or mistake.
40. 238 Md. 208, 216, 208 A.2d 710, 715 (1965) (Oppenheimer, J.), quoting from
Albert v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 209 Md. 27, 36-37, 120 A.2d 346, 350 (1956), which
in turn cites from Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 MD. L. Rev. 185,
204 (1938).
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cation of policy or discretion to a specific individual.'" The Maryland
rule on reclassifications has recently been reaffirmed over the dissent of
Judge Barnes in MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs.41
The second question posed has been answered by the Maryland
court by applying its distinction between legislative and administra42
tive acts established in the Mandel and Albert v. Public Serv. Commn
cases to later cases which hold that reclassifications may in some instances 'be treated as judicial decisions for purposes of determining
the availability of cross examination and the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata. This result is in accord with the approach adopted
by Justice Holmes for the Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Co. v. State
Board of Equalization,4" where the issue dealt with the extent to which
property owners had a right to a hearing on tax ordinances. The
Bi-Metallic rule rests on a realization that where regulations affect
large numbers of people, political, as distinct from judicial, checks are
more likely to be adequate. Professor Kenneth Davis has emphasized
a different factor: "no matter how numerous the parties, a trial usually
is the expedient device for resolving factual controversies that relate
to an individual, and no matter how few' 44the parties, a trial is usually
unnecessary for developing general facts. "
The Maryland court has been criticized by Judge Barnes and by
this journal's commentator, Mr. Goldman, for not subjecting the "spot
zoning" implicit in so-called "floating zone" provisions to scrutiny as
intensive as that applied to reclassifications, the court having instead
analogized such "floating zones" to special exceptions.4 5 The distinction between reclassifications and "floating zones" has been persuasively
defended, however:
The notice provided by an ordinance setting up special exceptions
is that certain specified uses will be permitted upon application,
subject to conditions, in specified zones from which they would be
excluded absent such approval. This degree of notice, however,
is also provided 'by the instant (floating zone) ordinance, its
41. 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
42. 209 Md. 27, 120 A.2d 346 (1956).
43. 239 U.S. 441, 444-46 (1915). See Cohen, supra note 18, at 8-15. On crossexamination in reclassification proceedings, see Hyson v. Montgomery County Council,
242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966) (J. Barnes concurred) ; Town of Somerset v. County
Board, 245 Md. 52, 225 A.2d 294 (1966); on reclassification denials as res judicata,
see Woodlawn Area Citizens' Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 216
A.2d 149 (1966) (J. Barnes dissented) ; on rules of evidence in reclassification proceedings, see Gorin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 244 Md. 106, 110, 223 A.2d 237, 239
(1966). The cases correspond closely to the proposals for statutory reform of zoning
procedures in BABCOCK, THZ ZONING GAME 154-59 (1966).

44. I DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVm LAW § 6.05 (1958). See the distinction made by
the Maryland court between Mayor and City Council v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d
588 (1948) ; County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946), discussed at
notes 57-61 infra.
45. See Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957), discussed in Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the FloatingZone, 23 MD. L. Rzv.
105 (1963). See also Board of County Comm'rs v. Tipton, 244 Md. 77, 222 A.2d 701
(1966). Contrast Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138, 220 A.2d 589 (1966);
Bujno v. Montgomery County Council, 243 Md. 110, 220 A.2d 126 (1966) ; Knudsen
v. Montgomery County Council, 241 Md. 436, 217 A.2d 97 (1966); Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A2d 751 (1965).
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enactment informs the residents that restricted industrial uses
would be selectively permitted subject to conditions. 6
The Court of Appeals has similarly stressed the importance of notice
in promulgating its rule against conditional grants of reclassifications
or so-called "contract zoning":
[R]estrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic evidence.
...
The peculiar circumstances which must be shown to support a variance from the basic plan . . . distinguish them from
facts such as those in the instant case, where the action taken is
based solely upon collateral promises. The former types of exception are by their 4very
nature, self-limiting; the latter has no in7
herent restriction.
Judge Barnes, unpersuaded, prefers the New York approach of
indulgence toward both reclassifications and floating zones, 48 and Judge
Henderson would have preferred an approach of hostility toward both,49
but whatever the merits of the Maryland court's distinction between
"spot reclassifications" and "floating zones," its approach remains far
more defensible than that, say, of the Pennsylvania court, which condemns "floating zones," 5 while continuing to view spot reclassifications with indulgence."' Likewise, the hostility of the New Jersey
courts52 and of two Illinois judges55 to arrangements which go beyond
the floating zone in providing for permit grants "not . . . based on an
advance determination of use categories, but on the quite different
principle that compatability should be determined in terms of individual
users and in light of circumstances existing at the time the new use
is proposed ' 54 has been unaccompanied by increased scrutiny by courts
in these states of spot reclassifications, 55 which are subject in considerable degree to the same vice.
The Maryland court has consistently chosen to look at substance
rather than form in determining whether local enactments are or are
46. Haar and Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning
or an Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. Rxv. 1552, 1569 (1961).
47. Baylis v. Mayor and City Council, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (1959).
See Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. Rsv. 121 (1963).
48. See MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 557, 210 A.2d 325
(1965) (dissenting opinion), approvingly citing, Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,
302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951), and Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands
Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959). See also Mack v. Crandell, 244 Md. 193,
223 A.2d 248 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
49. See Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 64, 133 A.2d 83, 92 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
50. Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
51. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964) ; Furniss
v. Township of Lower Merion, 412 Pa. 404, 194 A.2d 926 (1963).
52. Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
53. Ward of Village of Skokie, 26 Ill. 2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962), discussed
in Babcock and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Room, 111 U. PA. L.
R.v. 1040, 1088 (1963).
54. Haar and Hering, supra note 46, at 1572.
55. See Bruber v. Mayor and Township Committee, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489
(1962) ; Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91. 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951).
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not essentially legislative in character, 56 so as to be entitled to the presumption of validity attaching to comprehensive plans. Consistent with
this view it has held that any major departure from schemes based on
advance notice to property owners of zone lines toward a scheme resembling the British requirement of planning permission will require
revision of the state enabling act requiring zoning according to a comprehensive plan; and this has invalidated ordinances which exempt
particular pieces of property from prohibitions imposed on all property
throughout a municipality.5 7 In its hostility toward spot reclassifications, -the Maryland court has similarly taken the view that the zoning
enabling act embodies a requirement of what Professor Haar has re58
ferred to as "the rule of law in the Hayekian sense."
Where it has departed from its hostility toward spot reclassifications as in the floating zone cases 9 and the dubious cases involving
"buffing" revisions at the margin of zones," the Maryland court has
been at pains to show that violence has not been done to the values
of notice and equality underlying the traditional demand for uniform
rules laid down in advance. It likewise took pains to make such a
demonstration in County Comm'rs v. Ward, 1 where it upheld partial
zoning of a municipality against the objection that zoning was not
sufficiently comprehensive if portions of the political subdivision were
omitted from the plan. This writer doubts that the court can be charged
with misreading the intentions of the legislature in this respect, when
the history of the requirement of comprehensiveness in the standard
zoning enabling acts is considered.62 The fact that "ideas had changed"6 3
would not justify the court in disregarding the fact that the change
might only be one in the thinking of the planners, not in that of the
legislature. The law does, must, and should, for reasons fully eluciated
65
elsewhere, 6 4 lag somewhat behind the avant garde
if the democratic
will is to 'be respected and the prospect of swift and dangerous political
reaction resulting from alienation from the processes of government
avoided. It is best that we curb our sympathy for the impatient exclamations of the planners and their allies in the legal profession that
"new theories of planning are useless if they cannot be carried forth
'66
due to outmoded zoning law."
56. See Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty, Inc., 219 Md. 155, 148 A.2d 424
(1959).
57. Richmark Realty Co. v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A.2d 196 (1961); Mayor
and City Council v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 641, 62 A.2d 588, 592 (1948).
58. Haar and Hering, supra note 46, at 1563.
59. See cases cited note 55 supra.
60. E.g., Bishop v. Board of County Comm'rs, 230 Md. 494, 187 A.2d 851 (1963).
The cases are criticized in Babcock and Bosselman, supra note 53, at 1061. The limits
on "buffing" are described in Baker v. Montgomery County Council, 241 Md. 178, 185,
215 A.2d 831, 834-35 (1966) ; Board of County Comm'rs v. Farr, 242 Md. 315, 218
A.2d 923 (1966).
61. 186 Md. 330, 339, 46 A.2d 684, 688 (1946). See Haar, In Accordance with a
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HAav. L. Rtv. 1154, 1158-63 (1955).
62. Id. at 1154-58.
63. Goldman, at 52.
64. Cf. L. Hand, Is There a Common Will? (1929), in TH SPmIRT or LiBERTY 47
(Dillard 3d ed. 1960) ; Snowden v. Snowden, 1 Bland 550 (1829).
65. Cf. Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, 162 HARP4R'S MAGAZINE 101 (1950).
66. Goldman, at 55.
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Third, an additional source of difficulty is provided by the fact
that Maryland courts like those elsewhere have been troubled by the
problems arising from the lack of metropolitan government around
large cities. In an era of exploding population, the efforts of suburban
areas to exclude low-cost housing, 7 apartment houses, and such other
uses as trailer parks from their borders have aroused great controversy. 68 It is fair to suggest that what has been described as the "Negro

Revolution" will cause this controversy to intensify rather than abate
in future years.69 Courts elsewhere have been urged to invalidate local
suburban ordinances such as those excluding trailer parks on the basis
that they are out of tune with the spirit of the age and go beyond the
police power when viewed in the light not of local but of statewide or
metropolitan needs. 70 Against this, Professor Haar has observed:
"To those who regard the division of powers as a great contribution
of the American political system, the expense of such inefficiency is
a price well paid for the advantages of decentralized government
power . . .or, again, it may mean that different types of consumer

wants are being satisfied and a greater range of choice for the individual
as to types and costs of governmental services preserved."'"
Likewise, it has been observed:
[T]he most pernicious effect of exclusionary zoning in a segmented metropolitan area - retrogressive local taxation which
limits the members of each economic class to the community
facilities for which they can afford to pay on a per capita basis might be attacked by fiscal reform, rather than by zoning reform.
The problem could be relieved, for example, if a greater portion
of the revenues needed for vital community services, such as education, were provided through grants-in-aid through funds obtained
through progressive taxation at the state or federal level.72
Some courts have begun to inch toward holding that the validity
of local legislative acts, including the acts of municipalities with home
67. See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case,
66 HARv. L. Rzv. 1051 (1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning For Whom? - In
Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. Rev. 986 (1954) ; Nolan and Horack, How Small A House?
Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARv. L. REv. 967 (1954).
68. See Babcock and Bosselman, supra note 53, at 1059-74.
69. See Haar, supra note 67, at 1063 n.41; 37 CALI. L. Rtv. 493 (1949).
70. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
71. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
515, 531 (1957).
72. Sullivan, Flexibility and the Rule of Law in American Zoning Administration, LAW AND LAND 129, 156-57 (Haar ed. 1964). It is noteworthy that this perhaps
more politically promising approach is embodied in the recent Cooper-Hughes Report.
INTERIM REPORT OP THE MARYLAND COMMISSION STATE AND COUNTY FINANCE

(1965).

It is also ironic that success of this approach may be thwarted by the reapportionment
of state legislatures which many defenders of "activism in a known direction" (to
use Mr. Sickels' not disapproving phrase) advocate and celebrate. Reapportionment,
in Maryland if not elsewhere, seems as likely to exacerbate as to cure metropolitan
problems, since its prime beneficiaries are the more prosperous suburban counties,
whose representatives may be expected to oppose tax equalizing schemes (as well as
zoning reform, municipal taxing powers, and "fair housing" legislation). See Dixon,
Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for

Fair Representation, 63 MIcH. L. Rsv. 209, 222-30 (1964).
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rule, should be tested by their reasonableness as exercises of state
rather than local legislative power 78 and some commentators have gone
so far as to urge the Supreme Court to do for - or to - the zoning
powers of municipalities what it has already done for - or to - many

if not most of the independent decision-making powers of state governments 7 4 thus overriding -the long established view that "it is for the
State to determine its political subdivisions, the number and size of
its municipal corporations and their territorial extent. These are
matters of a local nature, in which the nation as a whole is not interested,
and in which, by the very nature of things, the determination of the
75
state authorities should be accepted as authoritative and controlling.
In Maryland, the pressure on the court has not involved efforts
to invalidate suburban zoning regulations, but rather to induce the
court to broaden the "error or change" rule in reclassification cases by
holding that increased metropolitan population constitutes a "change"
sufficient to warrant a board granting a zoning amendment. Thus Mr.
Goldman laments that "factors such as increased population and other
socio-economic changes would not be included. ' 7' The Maryland court
has been receptive to arguments based on population increase only in
cases involving reclassifications in favor of convenience facilities gasoline stations, and shopping centers - necessary to serve the increased population in the suburban area itself. The court, save for
one or two unfortunate lapses from grace involving "buffing" cases or
cases where there were physical change and the administrative record
(including, in some instances, planning commission findings) was
unusually strong,77 has maintained an attitude of relentless hostility
toward reclassifications in favor of suburban apartment developments.
Its attitude in these and similar cases is most fully expressed in Alvey
v. Michaels, where the court affirmed a trial court's reversal of a reclassification grant in favor of a marina. The decision stressed that:
The need for marinas in the locality . . . [is] not a local need,

but one to accommodate non-resident boating enthusiasts.
As to the question that this would be spot zoning legally
permissible under the circumstances, we have held that such is
legal when there is a need for a service in the area for the accom107.

73. Comment, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q.
74. See Babcock and Bosselman, supra note 53; Haar, supra note 67, 66 HARV.

L. Rxv. 1063 (1953).
75. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518 (1897). The traditional view went
even further in stressing the autonomy of municipal corporations and in analogizing
them to voluntary associations. Charters were granted and boundaries defined on the
basis of private petitions: "As the burdens of municipal government must rest upon
(the corporators') shoulders * * * it seems eminently proper that their voice shall be
heard on the question of their incorporation." COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
123 (2d ed. 1871).
76. Goldman, at 52.
77. See, e.g., Beth Tfiloh Congregation v. Blum, 242 Md. 84, 218 A.2d 29 (1966);
Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, 216 A.2d 530 (1966) ; Vogel v. McCush, 242 Md. 371,
219 A.2d 89 (1966) ; Rohde v. County Board of Appeals, 234 Md. 259, 199 A.2d 216
(1964).
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modation and convenience of the residents of the residential zone,
such as grocery stores, drug stores, barber shops, etc. .

.

. We do

not find on the record that 78another marina within this area would
come within this category.

This 79case was followed in the recent case of Board of Commr's

v. Kines.

The Maryland court has thus declined to make itself the judge of
whether restrictions on suburban apartment construction are wise
public policy. If suburban zoning is to be compelled to mesh with city
needs the compulsion must come, in the court's view, from action by
the state legislature authorizing and requiring a greater measure of
regional planning, not from ukases by the court in dealing with particular applications. That may seem a conservative approach, but its
wisdom should be apparent. To begin with, it is by no means clear
that -indulgence toward suburban construction is even wise public
policy. The increased availability of suburban building sites may
operate to discourage apartment construction in the deteriorating cores
of the central city. Moreover, most of such zoning proposals, at least
to date, involve apartment housing aimed at upper and middle income
brackets.80 The effect of exclusion may be, not to prevent the arrival
of deprived groups in the suburbs but to prevent the further exodus
of portions of the remaining urban middle class. It may also result
in a diversion of builders' energies toward construction of lowermiddle income apartment housing in the cities in preference to concentration on types of housing already approaching oversupply. But
apart from these arguable policy considerations, and apart from the
effects on the legal values of equality and notice alluded to in an earlier
portion of this article and the values of maintaining suburban selfgovernment and civic pride, it is plain that piecemeal granting of zoning reclassifications would operate as a discouragement rather than
aid to any fundamental reforms that may be needed in metropolitan
zoning. 'So long as builders can readily obtain reclassifications or
believe they can do so, little political pressure will be generated for
comprehensive legislative revision of the ordinances. If such pressure
were generated, it is fair to suggest that the economic self-interest of
the construction industry would carry at least as much weight in the
making of public policy as the preferences or prejudices of local residents. There is something to 'be said in this context for the old saw
78. 231 Md. 22, 25, 27, 188 A.2d 293, 294, 295 (1963). See Comment, 21 Mo. L.
Rxv. 306 (1961).
79. 239 Md. 119, 125, 210 A2d 367, 370 (1965). Parenthetically, it may be noted
that the opinion in the Kines case upsetting a reclassification grant was written by
Judge Hammond, the supposed advocate of flexibility in zoning and for deference to
local boards. See also Alvey v. Hedin, 243 Md. 334, 221 A.2d (1966), reaffirnzing
Alvey v. Michaels on the same facts. Recent apartment house cases include Board of
County Comm'rs v. Kay, 240 Md. 690, 215 A.2d 206 (1966) ; Baker v. Montgomery
County Council, 241 Md. 178, 215 A.2d 831 (1965); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Edmonds, 240 Md. 681, 215 A.2d 209 (1965) ; Sampson Bros. v. Board, 240 Md. 116,
213 A.2d 289 (1965).

80. As to this case, see Babcock and Bosselman, supra note 53, at 1053-55.
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that the best way to change a bad law is to enforce it.8' And that there
is, in fact, at least some possibility that legislatures will act to foster
metropolitan zoning is sufficiently suggested by the movement toward
earnings taxes and tax equalization and by the fact that the Maryland
legislature has already joined in moves in this direction respecting
area,8 2 and that its actions
zoning in the Washington metropolitan
83
court.
the
by
upheld
have been
In its approach to these metropolitan problems, as in its maintenance of the substantial evidence rule and its refusal to allow zoning
boards to substitute planning for zoning techniques without legislative
authorization, the Maryland court has pursued a course, not of erratic
activism, but of "genuine judicial restraint" as Mr. Sickels defines it.
We have seen in our discussion of these three issues that the court
has declined to make major innovations in zoning law to reflect its
views as to wise public policy. It correlatively can be shown that the
court, unlike those of many other states, has placed few obstacles in
the way of legislative acceptance of new zoning tools and techniques.
One commentator has identified six issues which may be used
to test attitudes of state courts toward legislative power in zoning
matters.8 4 He has shown that the Michigan and New Jersey Supreme
Courts differ greatly in their willingness to allow total exclusion of
unpopular uses from municipalities, in their willingness to allow noncumulative use districts or "floating zones," in the extent to which
they are prepared to accept the compulsory amortization of non-conforming uses, in their decisions on validity of ordinances establishing
minimum lot sizes and minimum house sizes, and in the extent to
which they are willing to allow aesthetic considerations to be taken into
consideration in zoning. The New Jersey court allows scope to such
experiments; the Michigan court does not. Maryland has chosen to
align itself with New Jersey. Its court has squarely upheld the validity
of floating zones 5 and compulsory amortization of non-conforming
uses," and has also shown signs of indulgence towards area restrictions,8 7 zoning for aesthetic purposes,8 8 and total exclusion of dis81. Cf. Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. Rev. 1 (1957). See also Haar, supra note 71,
at 536: "Courts . . . do not seem the most desirable focus for resolving inter-community conflicts or promoting regional land development."
82. LAws oF MD. ch. 780 (1959). Cf. the proposal for a revised state zoning
enabling act limiting municipal powers in BABCOCK, THz ZONING GAMZ 159-66 1966).
83. Middleman v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm n, 232
Md. 285, 192 A.2d 787 (1963).
84. Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan and New Jersey: A Comparative
Study, 63 MIcH. L. Rv. 1171 (1965).
85. Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
86. Grant v. Mayor and City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) ; Eutaw
Enterprises, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d 348 (1966).
Cf. Mayor and City Council v. Berg, 216 Md. 292, 139 A.2d 703, concurring opinion,
140 A.2d 663 (1958). See Comment, 24 MD. L. Rev. 323 (1964). But see Stevens v.
City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965), where amortization is not
without its limits.
87. See R. B. Constr. Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 137 Atd. 278 (1927) (4-3
decision) (upholding yard requirements); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 716 (1965). But see
County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 331, 340, 46 A.2d 684, 688 (1946) (dictum)
(questioning building size requirements) ; Annot., 96 A.L.R2d 1408 (1965).
88. Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50 (1924) (6-2 decision), is
hostile to zoning based on aesthetics but is in increasing disrepute. See Master
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favored uses. a9 If that is not "genuine restraint," it is hard to see
what would be.
Mr. Goldman's appeal for judicial consideration of "changed
viewpoints as to the needs and interests of the whole community"9
would thus seem misguided. It has recently been observed:
[T]he kind of law that is made depends significantly on the
kind of law-making agency that is employed. The courts are
well adapted to weigh the competing claims of individual litigants;
but they are poorly equipped to resolve broad issues of policy
involving, for example, the reallocation of resources among large
social groups or classes. Judicial lawmaking in the latter areas is
confronted by a dual peril; it may ignore considerations relevant
to intelligent policy formulation, or, in taking them into account,
it may inspire doubts about the integrity of the judicial process.
[Ernst] Freund, writing half a century ago, saw the first as the
primary danger. Recent developments in our public law illustrate
that today the latter may also be a source of concern."'
It is true that deference to legislative bodies and the principles
of prior cases, as distinct from partisanship between classes and persons, may possibly lead to what Mr. Sickels describes as a "low level
of determinacy and predictability from the point of view of the litigant,
whose interest is in results." 2 Of course, the legal trains do not always
Royalties Corp. v. Mayor and City Council, 235 Md. 74, 88, 200 A.2d 652, 659 (1964) ;
Grant v. Mayor and City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) ; Feldstein v.
Kammuf, 209 Md. 479, 121 A.2d 716 (1956) ; Laque v. State, 207 Md. 242, 113 A.2d
893 (1955). The new provisions of the state zoning enabling act authorizing historical
preservation districts are as yet untested in the courts (see MD. CoDE ANN. art. 66B,
§§ 38-50 (1957)), though two early cases appear to uphold such zoning. See Cochran
v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 229, 70 Atl. 113, 114 (1908) ; Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md. 260,
267, 3 Atl. 597, 600 (1886). The Maryland cases and statute of law on aesthetics thus
follow the approach urged by Ernst Freund:
[I]t is undesirable to force by law upon the community standards of taste which
a representative legislative body may happen to approve of, and compulsion with
that end in view would be justly resented as inconsistent with a traditional spirit
of individualism. But it is a different question whether the state may not protect
the works of nature or the achievements of art or the associations of history from
being wilfully marred. In other words, emphasis should be laid on the character
of the place as having an established claim to consideration and upon the idea of
disfigurement as distinguished from the falling short of some standard of beauty.
FRUND, STANDARDS op AMERICAN LEGISLATION 115-16 (1917).
89. No Maryland cases involving total exclusion from a municipality have been
discovered, but the court has been indulgent toward exclusions of specified uses from
residential districts. See Grant v. Mayor and City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957) (billboards); Kahl v. Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Co., 191
Md. 249, 60 A.2d 754 (1948) (6-2 decision) (overheard lines) ; Ullrich v. State, 186
Md. 353, 46 A.2d 637 (1946) (funeral homes). Cf. Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240
Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965) (corner posts).
90. Goldman, at 53, quoting from Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee,
39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962).
91. F. A. Allen, Ernst Freund and the New Age of Legislation, 13 U. CHL L.S.
RxcoRD 1, 8 (1965). For similar recent warnings to the courts from sources likewise
distinguished for their responsibility and moderation, see Breitel, The Lawmakers,
65 COLUM. L. Rev. 749 (1965); P. A. Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, OHIO ST. L.J.
225 (1965) ; Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1001
(1965).
92. Sickels, at 104.
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run on time when the courts abjure the comforts and certainties of rule
by fiat. Professor Haar reminds us of "other traditional concepts
which are perhaps more important than zoning principles, old or new.
Notice, equality under the law and all ,that makes up our notion of
fairness may be wrongly sacrificed in the name of progress."9 Mr.
Goldman takes the view that "until it [the "mistake or change" rule]
is discarded for a more modem test, progress in Maryland will be
retarded." ' 94 In upholding the floating zone decisions, he observes, "of
course, property values may fall, but this is usually not a legitimate
zoning concern." 95 This plausible observation, however, begs many
important questions. Evidence as to effects on values has long been
admissible in zoning determinations. Some commentators have urged
that maximization of property values is the real, and should be the
avowed, purpose of zoning. 6 And, of course, one effect of stability in
zoning is to encourage investment and development - purposes themselves proper objects of zoning.
Whatever our answers to these problems, we shall not join in
condemning a court and its attendant press and legal commentators
for keeping "alive a presumption against the significance of judicial
ind'ividuality."9 7 Nor should we assail as reactionary a body of legal
doctrine which clearly defines present law while leaving the way open
to the unobstructed enactment of modern reforms by the legislature. It
would not seem improper to close this brief commentary with the words
of Judge Learned Hand: "let the judges be brought to book when they
go wrong, but by those who take the trouble to understand them."9 "
93. Haar and Hering, supra note 46, at 1573. See Dunham, Book Review, 62
HARV. L. Rlv. 1414 (1949).
94. Goldman, at 55.
95. Id. at 60-61.
96. McBain, Law Making by Property Owners, 36 POL. Sci. Q. 617, 639 (1921),
partially reprinted in SELrCTXD ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518 (1938);
BABCoCK, THE ZONING GAmn 116-20 (1966).
97. Sickels, at 102.
98. Learned Hand, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision, THig
SPIRIT o, LIBFRTY 103, 110 (Dilliard 3d ed. 1953). Judge Hand also supplied the best
answer to the title of Mr. Sickels' article, with its reference to "the illusion of
judicial consensus":
[Ilt is well for us to pause and consider how important in the days ahead
may be his attempt to keep alive at the end, as he did at the beginning, the
tradition of detachment and aloofness without which, I am persuaded, courts and
judges will fail. And make no mistake, that tradition is under attack, even if it
be not a frontal attack. We are assured that only the unsophisticated and naive
will believe in the reality of detachment and aloofness in judges, or in anyone
else. These philosophers believe that they have burrowed too far into the visceral
origins of all beliefs and of all convictions to be fobbed off by the ingenuous
assumptions of a simpler age. None of us can ever escape covertly seeking our
interests; our disguises, be they ever so ingenious, are easily penetrated; our
shams are readily exposed. Let us not underrate the power of this attack; let us
remember how desperately in our own youth we too dreaded appearing to be
without guile; how we longed to be reckoned astute and enfranchised; and let
us not forget that youth is the same now as then. Therefore it is fitting for us
to meet here today in grateful commemoration of the life of this stalwart, truehearted, steadfast champion of a faith whose disappearance will in the end bring
with it a relapse into the reign of the tooth and claw.
Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, THS SPIRIT or LIBErY
201, 207-08 (Dilliard 3d ed. 1960).

